2008 enhanced national, regional and international efforts to improve systemic stability in banking The WritePass Journal

How the global financial crisis of 2007/2008 enhanced national, regional and international efforts to improve systemic stability in banking Introduction: How the global financial crisis of 2007/2008 enhanced national, regional and international efforts to improve systemic stability in banking Introduction:Basel  IPillar one  Pillar two:Pillar three:   II.  Why regulate banks:III.  The Financial Crisis: what happened?IV. An evaluation of Basel II as a uniform system of International banking regulation:1. Shortcomings of Basel I1.1. Procyclicality: 1.2. Unfair competition:1.2.1. Compliance Cost1.2.1.1.  Ã‚  Lack of supervisory uniformityV. Conclusion:ReferenceRelated Introduction: The global financial crisis of 2007/2008 has enhanced national, regional and international efforts, to improve the monitoring of systemic stability in banking. It exposed the weaknesses of the current regime the Basel I; thus leading to increase pressure for a tougher uniform regulation in the banking system. This paper briefly discusses the importance of banks and why they should be regulated; and the causes of the financial crisis. It then goes on further to discuss and evaluate in detail Basel II and the weaknesses of such a uniform system of International banking regulation. Basel  I Following criticisms of Basel I and the increasing complex and global nature of bank operations; the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision hereon ‘the Committee’, published Basel II in 2004. Basel II is an international regulatory framework on capital adequacy of internationally active banks. It is an international standard for national regulators to follow when setting standards for minimum capital. For some, Basel II is one of the most successful uniform regulations, at least in the commercial field[1]. It has been signed by 12 countries and the wake of the financial crisis has led emerging markets and countries such as those in the Asian Pacific region to adopt some of its provisions. Despite its popularity amongst some, many banks still preferred to adopt Basel I because of the complex nature and cost of compliance associated with Basel II; which is feared will be transferred to borrowers through higher capital charges.[2] Though a soft law, it can be argued that Basel II is being adopted by banks not only to encourage international reciprocity, but also because of the benefits it has to offer. It offers an opportunity for banks to improve their sustainability and competitive advantage because it aims at securing financial stability through aligning capital closely with risks.   Unlike Basel I, Basel II achieves this through securing sophisticated approaches to calculating credit and market risks and now operational risks. Others[3] have questioned the practicality of the minimum regulatory capital under Basel II. This is because banks tend to hold more capital due to market forces and national regulation may demand higher capital than Basel II. Whilst the above statement is true, one argues that an international standard of this nature is a necessity justified by the need to prevent systemic risk and to control banks from engaging in excessive risks. Thereby creating market discipline and inherently safeguarding the safety and soundness of the international banking system. Basel II operates on a three pillar approach: Pillar one addresses capital requirements and risks management. Pillar two addresses the supervisory review process. Pillar three addresses market discipline.  Ã‚  Ã‚   Pillar one It proposes three compliance methods for minimum capital based on the complexity of the bank. These include the standard approach and the Internal Ratings Based (IRB) approaches. Smaller banks are encouraged to adopt the standard approach and the larger banks the IRB approaches. Under the standard approach, assignment of risk weights are handled by external credit rating agencies, a commendable move as each bank’s risks will be defined more accurately.   Nonetheless, this approach raises concern as it does not eradicate the risk of capital arbitrage nor complacency since it is not subjected to supervision unlike the IRB approach[4]. Moreover, the IRB approaches even though banks worry about compliance cost, is more likely than the standard approach to increase banks safety and soundness; simply because it empowers banks to understand and estimate their potential risks.   Yet, how reliable is this approach? It is too complex and provides a bank with a lot of discretion which may be abused through creating risk models for regulatory purposes (regulatory arbitrage).[5] Nonetheless, this risk appears to have been reduced by pillar two which authorises supervisors to monitor and approve these models. However, it is believed that the IRB approaches could led to inconsistent regulatory application and treatment of risks by banks. A standardised approach on the other hand, eradicates such inconsistencies though it reduces the willingness to enhance risk controls[6]. Despite its weaknesses, pillar one seeks to promote stronger risk management practices amongst the banks, and therefore its main attraction. Although its name depicts it as a mere improvement of Basel I, Basel II does not incorporate a ‘one size fits all’ approach to risk management as that would hardly reflect the true nature of the borrower’s risk[7].   Pillar two: This pillar provides supervisors the power to review bank risk models and provide constructive feedback. It maintains control over bank practices and harmonises supervision. The discretion it offers is critical given the international scope of Basel II in order to fit into national regulations, differing bank practices and unforeseen innovations. Notwithstanding, there is no provision within the pillar for the extent of these supervisory powers or enforcement actions towards poorly managed institutions,[8] making the discretion too wide.   Therefore, not only could such a wide discretion strain the relationship between the banks and supervisors; it could distort consistent regulatory application as supervisors can in effect enforce these standards however they see fit.[9] Consequently, this creates an unbalanced levelled playing field at an international level. Moreover, the Committee appears to have failed to give much thought to effectively linking pillar 1 and 2. Whilst banks ar e encouraged under pillar one to adopt banking strategies, pillar 2 significantly curtails this freedom. It is for these reasons that it is believed to be the weakest pillar of all and unlikely to promote soundness and stability[10]. Pillar three: Pillar three compliments the first two pillars and pays particular focus on enhancing transparency and prudential banking. Banks are required to publicly disclose information such as capital structure and capital adequacy.   As a result, greater bank discipline will be achieved and consequently, economic efficiency. However, it fails to demand the disclosure of essential information in areas relating to credit risks and internal and external ratings by major banks. Additionally, banks may not be willing to disclose information where capital ratios are falling;[11] consequently, this pillar is only a ‘first step towards providing a foundation for market discipline’[12]    II.  Why regulate banks: Basel II cannot be discussed in isolation without reference to banks and the role they play, because banks are the sole reason for the existence of Basel II. Banks are central to the economic activities of every society, what Cohen refers to as the ‘oil that lubricates the wheel of commerce’[13].   Moreover, they are vital source of sustenance of every economy because they provide finances for various commercial purposes as well as access to payment.   Their activities have a huge impact on society and failure could result in dire consequences. In 2007, setbacks brought about by failure of Northern Rock resulted in systemic bank failures and eventually a recession in the United Kingdom (UK) economy. Society has had to bear the burden of sustaining the economy through spending cuts, redundancies, unemployment and increase in prices of goods and services. Additionally, banks are more reluctant to give out loans and people are less willing to spend and leading to a decl ine in economic growth. This partly explains why there are numerous on going debates on banking regulation. Banks have been described differently by different people. For some a bank is inherently a dangerous institution that will generate crises from time to time.[14]   Banks are fragile and one bank failure could spread systemically with devastating results on society[15] and the international banking system as discussed in the previous chapter. Cranston[16] argues that a failure could cause customers in other banks to rush in to withdraw their savings; causing a liquidity crisis. Whilst there may be a real risk of this happening, it is argued that it is not always the case.   Customers of other UK banks, for example, did not rush to withdraw money from their banks because of the failure of Northern Rock. Rather its collapse seemed to have raised public concern and awareness on the fragility and susceptibility of banks to collapsing.   This confirms the perspective that bank failure and fragility does not mean that the financial system is failing but rather that it should be handle d carefully[17]. Additionally, consumer protection is necessary to prevent abuse of power by unscrupulous bankers who may encourage consumers to enter into financial transactions that may be unbeneficial to them. What is more is that, regulations should not only protect customers but also ensure that public confidence in the stability of the financial system is enhanced and protected.[18]These explain why banks need to be regulated so that their activities do no increase systemic risk, spread to other jurisdictions and plunge the economies into financial crisis like the case of 2007/2008. All in all, the underlying reason for regulating banks is to ensure bank soundness and stability both nationally and internationally, and to prevent systemic risks. III.  The Financial Crisis: what happened? Similarly, Basel II cannot be discussed without a mention of the financial crisis, because, due to the crisis, the debate on Basel II and its role in the financial crisis has been intense. The recent financial crisis, â€Å"arguably the greatest crisis in the history of financial capitalism†[19]   has raised a lot of political and academic debate on its causes including the following: Inadequate regulatory framework and supervision[20] Macro-economic imbalances and housing policies in the United States (US)[21] Poor risk management[22] The financial crisis has undoubtedly revealed inadequacies with current banking regulations. The international framework at the time, Basel II[23], was not adequately designed to prevent or deal with the global financial meltdown. However, should not be completely responsible for the collapse of the banking system. Many of the factors that led to the crisis were in place long before the establishment of Basel II[24]. Nevertheless, one would have expected Basel II to be designed to curb these known practices, inherently preventing or mitigating the crisis. It was inadequate and focused a lot on capital requirements with no guidance for liquidity management, an issue that is now to be addressed by Basel III[25]. For example, the Northern Rock crisis was not as a result of inadequate capital but a lack of a strong asset base[26]. Furthermore, at a domestic level, the UK’s banking regulation operated on a less invasive, less strict basis for fear of forcing out lucrative International banks to other countries.[27]This system may have worked for years, but it failed when it was most needed.   The Financial Services Authority (FSA) failed to ensure adequate supervision of banking system, inherently failing to prevent the crisis or mitigate its effects[28]. This is evident in the fact that it: ‘focused excessively on risks at the level of the individual firm, rather than the aggregate picture, as well as placing an over-emphasis on conduct-of-business regulation rather than its prudential responsibilities’.[29] The FSA failed to take over Northern Rock during early stages; this is partly why the Special Resolution Regime[30] was introduced to give it powers of early intervention. Nonetheless, given the nature of the regulations in place and the global nature of the financial crisis it is doubtful that the FSA could have prevented systemic risks. In addition, to the origin of the crisis from the sub-prime markets in the US, the US economy was consuming more than it was producing as reflected in its large deficit.[31] Besides, there has been plenty of talk in the media about bankers being the cause of the crisis; with bankers such as Sir Fred Godwin at the forefront of the firing squad.[32] These bankers were recklessly engaged in affordable credit facilities and excessive remuneration. Financial innovation led to the creation of complex products and excessive risk taking by the banks that lacked adequate capital to safeguard against failures. However, the pitfalls in the banking system should not rest solely with bankers and the regulators but also with the consumers.[33] Consumers’ insatiable desire for high living standards and the economic growth of previous years also contributed to the recklessness and complacency of bankers.   Whilst consumerism has been great for social growth, its negative impact on the econo my cannot be underestimated and should be partly blamed for the financial crisis[34]. IV. An evaluation of Basel II as a uniform system of International banking regulation: With an understanding of the origin and the aim of Basel II, this section will now closely examine and asses Basel II as a uniform system on international banking. Basel II meets the requirements of a uniform regulation through providing rigorous and detailed guidance on capital requirements applicable to all banks. It takes into consideration differences in bank sizes and operations. Moreover, its three compliance methods for capital requirements respectively apply uniformly to all banks depending on their size.   Therefore, this reassures member countries and non-member countries that banks within their country and other countries are sufficiently safe and sound financially; and unlikely to create systemic risk or worsen an international financial crisis[35]. Hence, such reassurance helps to prevent banks from being perceived by the international community as dangerous, unattractive or left isolated in the international financial sphere. Moreover, its menu of approaches to capital requirements such as the standard approach is suitable for both developed and developing countries as well as small and large banks. Basel II reduces regulatory burden by ensuring that banks operating in more than one country comply with only one and similar financial regulation. If for example, a bank like HSBC with global operations has to comply with different banking and financial regulations in different countries, it might experience confusion due to the regulatory differences, which might lead to waste of valuable time and increase compliance cost which could be reinvested into other profitable areas. The result may be that, banks may refrain from international operations because the costs may outweigh the benefits. If this occurs, it could have dire consequences for some economies. Additionally, Basel II creates a level playing field where single set of rules and a standard level of supervision are uniformly applicable to all banks.   For example, its capital requirements ensure that all banks hold a minimum regulatory capital and as such domestic banks cannot have lower capital rates in comparison to foreign banks. Implying that, domestic banks cannot hold less capital whilst investing the other into profitable ventures which may in turn increase their market share, thereby enhancing their competitiveness at the expense of foreign banks. Consequently, Basel II eliminates legal barriers and barriers to fair competition and by so doing, promoting efficiency, uniformity and prudential international banking[36]. Whilst Basel II has the ability to act as an instrument of fairness and uniformity in International banking, nevertheless, it has a number of shortcomings including procyclicality and unfair competition which will be discussed further below. 1. Shortcomings of Basel I 1.1. Procyclicality: As a uniform system of International banking, Basel II can create pro-cyclicality and disproportionate capital requirements which can lead to huge consequences on macroeconomics. It does not promote consistency throughout an economic cycle, an important component of banking stability. Under Basel II during a boom, banks will appear better capitalised, more likely to lend and make risky investment. However, when the value of assets starts dropping; these banks will appear to be below the minimum capital requirements. For example, the IRB approach is too sensitive to macroeconomic variations and will enhance pro-cyclicality unlike the standard approach which is designed with focus on the credit worthiness of the borrower throughout the economic cycle[37]. Ratings are updated annually under IRB approaches, therefore, during a recession a high risk borrower will reflect a higher probability of default, leading to higher capital charges. This over reliance on risk sensitivity distorts reg ulatory capital when banks are in need of it. The larger risk weights and strict regulatory capital requirements could lead to banks refusing to lend money during a recession and excessive lending during a boom. This could also have a significant impact on developing countries who may suffer a reduction in international lending or a significant increase in their borrowing cost; as they will be reflected as high risk borrowers with a high probability of default.   Nevertheless, some argue that this will not be the case since banks price using economic not regulatory capital[38]. Supporters of Basel II argue that allowing banks to have their own risk model reduces the effect on pro-cyclicality.[39] Additionally, it is not entirely clear that Basel II will aggravate procyclicality because pillar one requires banks to stress-test their credit portfolios and rate borrowers according to their ability to pay back with a recession in mind. Additionally, pillar two requires supervisors to take into account procyclicality during the review process where the bank fails to do so.[40] Therefore, the procyclical effects of Basel II cannot be fully justified given the mechanisms in place under pillar one and two. Moreover, a certain degree of procyclicality is inevitable and appropriate if a bank’s capital is to be closely aligned to its risks for prudential purposes[41].Albeit this, Basel II is bad economics in its attempt to use market prices to predict market failures. It is procyclical, something a uniform regulation should avoid and that may explain why the Ba sel III aims to reduce procyclicality by demanding that banks hold a countercyclical capital buffer of 0% 2.5% by January 2019[42]. 1.2. Unfair competition: Enhancing uniformity and competitive equality is one of the main aims of Basel II. However, it is often difficult to draft rules that will take into account institutional and legal differences and yet apply similarly to all. However, Basel II in its attempt to move away from the ‘one size fits all’ approach may create a breeding ground for unfair competition because there are winners and losers. As it stands, larger banks are favoured because as a result of the nature and complexity of their operations they are more likely to qualify for the IRB model. Hence, they will enjoy a 2% 3% reduction in capital which may be invested in other profitable ventures. For example, in the EU, Basel II is applicable to all banks irrespective of their size or geographical location. This might give larger banks an unfair competitive advantage as the anticipation of lower regulatory requirements can cause them to manipulate risk portfolios and take on excessive risks. This may occur at th e expense of financial stability and smaller banks; that through the standard approach may have the quality of their portfolio worsen[43], causing them to lose market shares. Additionally, because of the wide supervisory powers under pillar two, supervision amongst countries may not be uniform and this may place other countries in a better competitive position than others. For example, countries that are stringent in the application of Basel II rules may be at a competitive disadvantage than countries that do not[44] because their banks may have more capital to invest in other areas. Moreover, Basel II does not apply to non-deposit taking lenders but who nonetheless compete in the financial market. Accordingly, they are placed in a better position, since they comply with lower capital rates than banks that have to comply with Basel II. 1.2.1. Compliance Cost The cost of introducing such a uniform system of regulation such as Basel II may be very high, placing an unnecessary burden on some. For example, the lack in uniformity of capital requirements may have a significant impact on emerging economies and markets as the risk management systems will be costly to introduce. Therefore, the balance of the cost and benefits for introducing and implementing it may be disproportionate.[45] On the other hand, more advanced and developed markets and economies are placed at an advantage. Largely because, aside from the benefit enjoyed by larger banks, the more developed economies and countries are more likely to be equipped and well-resourced to effectively supervise their banks.[46] Consequently, they are in a better position to enjoy the benefits of Basel II than the emerging economies or developing countries. Additionally, where these emerging economies and developing countries fail to implement Basel II they could become unattractive. Nonetheles s, these countries can start by introducing the less complex standard approach and then progress as the economies grows. 1.2.1.1.  Ã‚  Lack of supervisory uniformity As a uniform system the effective implementation Basel II is dependent on voluntary cooperation, yet the discretion and independence of supervisory powers and abilities under pillar 2 are too wide. This could create conflict where the home and host countries follow different schemes of regulations, for example a host country may impose in the place of the IRB approaches the standardised approach for a bank that follows the IRB in its home country in order to avoid lower capital requirements and competitive advantage over domestic banks. Additionally, Basel II formalises the role of external credit rating agencies in assessing bank risks. Whilst they play an important role, their record especially in the recent Asian crisis, raises concern because they are not regulated like the IRB models. The absence of a standard of ratings could lead to capital arbitrage caused by banks shopping for favourable ratings. Hence, encouraging unfair competition amongst agencies as well as intensifying procyclicality of bank lending[47]. This lack of uniformity in the regulation of rating standards and supervision could raise serious concerns in achieving its aim of soundness and stability. An organisation responsible for regulating these rating agencies should be created to ensure that they adhere to the same level of supervision as the IRB models.[48]   This issue is now being tackled by Basel III by requiring the registration and supervision of credit agencies[49]. V. Conclusion: It is without a doubt that Basel II has contributed to prudential banking both at an international and national level; through its three pillars on better risk management, greater transparency and greater supervision. Through its pillars, Basel II offers many great opportunities for banks such as the ability to improve sustainability and competitiveness through closely aligning their risks with capital. It also reduces regulatory burden and to some extent creates a level playing field as it seeks to ensure that the same rules are applicable to all banks. A uniform international banking regulation is greatly desirable and needed as a result of the increasing global operations of banks and constant development in the financial sector. Regardless, Basel II does not fulfill the requirements of a uniform system. Its three pillars although developed with a great vision in mind, fail to make it a desirable piece of uniform regulation. Basel II as a uniform system of banking regulation focuses a lot on capital requirements, ignoring other important areas of banking such as liquidity management. As a result, it failed to prevent or mitigate the financial crisis and its effects. A harmonising international standard that seeks to achieve consistency yet is highly flexible such as Basel II is more than likely to fail. Basel II is over detailed, complex and vague as such relies a great deal on domestic supervisors for effective implementation, which will in effect fail to achieve consistency and uniformity, hence its main weakness. Whilst an international banking regulation is needed, Basel I is highly flawed, hence the reason for the new Basel II Accord. Reference [1] R Bollen, ‘The International financial system and future global regulation’ JIBLR (2008) 23(9), 462 quoting from Felson and Bilali, ‘The role of the bank’ (2004) http://login.westlaw.co.uk/maf/wluk/app/document?src=rlsrguid=ia744c0970000012fd01158ecc34d593cdocguid=I53D96EE057A211DDA3BBFE4B3DB72F6Bhitguid=I53D96EE057A211DDA3BBFE4B3DB72F6Bspos=8epos=8td=15crumb-action=appendcontext=37resolvein=true accessed 21st April 2011 [2] FJ Carden de Carvalho, Basel II:   A critical assessment (March 2005) 1-4 ie.ufrj.br/eventos/seminarios/pesquisa/basel_ii_a_critical_assessment.pdf accessed 26th April 2011 [3] DK Tarullo, ‘Banking on Basel: The future of International Financial Regulation (1st edn, The Peterson Institute For International Economics, 2008) 141-143 [4] D Coskun, ‘Credit-rating agencies in the Basel II framework: Why the standardised approach is inadequate for regulatory capital purposes’ (2010 )JIBLR 157-169, 164 http://login.westlaw.co.uk/maf/wluk/app/document?src=rlsrguid=ia744d05f0000012fd08ca524199ce1a6docguid=IB858F4F230AC11DF9C83BB18AACF6BDBhitguid=IB858F4F230AC11DF9C83BB18AACF6BDBspos=1epos=1td=1crumb-action=appendcontext=6resolvein=true accessed 21st April 2011 [5]D K Tarullo, ‘Banking on Basel: The future of International Financial Regulation (1st edn, The Peterson Institute For International Economics, 2008) 170 [6] A A Jobst, ‘Regulation of Operational risks under the new Basel Capital Accord critical Issues’, (2007) JIBLR 22(5) 264 http://login.westlaw.co.uk/maf/wluk/app/document?src=rlsrguid=ia744d05f0000012fd0b2f898199ce260docguid=I25B9EA20E3D211DBB19ABA1496637E01hitguid=I25B9EA20E3D211DBB19ABA1496637E01spos=10epos=10td=24crumb-action=appendcontext=36resolvein=true accessed 21st April 2011 [7] G LIND, ‘Basel II – the new framework for bank capital’   Economic Review 2, 2005, 23 riksbank.com/upload/Dokument_riksbank/Kat_publicerat/Artiklar_PV/Lind.pdf accessed 16th April 2011 [8] D Vanhoose, ‘Market Discipline and Supervisory Discretion in Banking: Reinforcing or Conflicting Pillars Banking’ (Networks Financial Institute, Indiana State University) 2007 WP 06,26 networksfinancialinstitute.org/Lists/Publication%20Library/Attachments/56/2007-WP-06_VanHoose.pdf accessed 15th April 2011 [9] F J Cardim de Carvalho ‘Basel II:   A critical assessment’,(March 2005) 19 [10] D Vanhoose, ‘Market Discipline and Supervisory Discretion in Banking: Reinforcing or Conflicting Pillars Banking’ (Networks Financial Institute, Indiana State University) 2007 WP 06, 25 networksfinancialinstitute.org/Lists/Publication%20Library/Attachments/56/2007-WP-06_VanHoose.pdf accessed 26th April 2011 [11] D K Tarullo, ‘Banking on Basel: The future of International Financial Regulation (1st edn, The Peterson Institute For International Economics, 2008) 178 [12] D Vanhoose, ‘Market Discipline and Supervisory Discretion in Banking: Reinforcing or Conflicting Pillars Banking’ (Networks Financial Institute, Indiana State University) 2007 WP 06, 24-25 [13] BJ Cohen, ‘In Whose Interest? International Banking and American Foreign Policy’ (New Haven, CN: Yale University Press 1986) cited in O JACOBSOHN, ‘Impact of Basel II on the South African banking system’ (2004) Magister Commercii in Business Management Rand Afrikaans University, 72 http://ujdigispace.uj.ac.za:8080/dspace/bitstream/10210/273/1/Dissertation7.pdf accessed 1st May 2011 [14]House of Commons Treasury Committee, ‘Banking Crisis: regulation and supervision’, 2008-09 available at parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmtreasy/767/767.pdf accessed 15th April 2011 [15] This is commonly referred to as systemic risk. [16] R Cranston, Principles of Banking Law (2nd edn OUP 2002)   66-67 [17]MJB Hall and GG Kaufman, ‘International Banking Regulation’ (2002), 8 www.luc.edu/faculty//InternationalBankingRegulation7-12-02.doc accessed 15th May [18] This is also objective 2   of regulators laid down in s.4 of the Banking Act 2009 [19] A Peel, ‘The Turner Review’ (2009) 33 CSR 9, 70,1 lexisnexis.com/uk/legal/results/docview/docview.do?docLinkInd=truerisb=21_T11911683585format=GNBFULLsort=PUBLISHED-DATE,D,H,$PSEUDOLOSK,A,HstartDocNo=1resultsUrlKey=29_T11911683589cisb=22_T11911683588treeMax=truetreeWidth=0csi=280148docNo=1 accessed 15th April 2011 [20]   C Chambers, ‘The Reforms: A Political Safe Haven or Political Suicide – is the Labour bubble bursting?’ (2011) JFRC 19(1), 2 http://login.westlaw.co.uk/maf/wluk/app/document?src=rlsrguid=ia744c0970000012fcff20386f488fee9docguid=I6213C8F246DF11E0A6ECC01597E875E2hitguid=I6213C8F246DF11E0A6ECC01597E875E2spos=2epos=2td=15crumb-action=appendcontext=17resolvein=true accessed 15th April 2011; Deputy K Ekholm, ‘Some lessons from the financial crisis for monetary policy’ (4th December 2009) bis.org/review/r091214c.pdf accessed 15th April 2011 [21] F J Cardim de Carvalho ‘Basel II:   A critical assessment’,(March 2005) 19 ie.ufrj.br/eventos/seminarios/pesquisa/basel_ii_a_critical_assessment.pdf accessed 26th April 2011 [22] IH-Y Chiu, ‘Legislation, regulatory and governance reforms in financial regulation: reflections on the global financial crisis’ Editorial, Comp Law,(2010) 31(6), 165 http://login.westlaw.co.uk/maf/wluk/app/document?src=rlsrguid=ia744cc630000012fcfffcb546e891311docguid=IECBD4B406ACE11DFB49F99FD3B90BEF9hitguid=IECBD4B406ACE11DFB49F99FD3B90BEF9spos=15epos=15td=262crumb-action=appendcontext=30resolvein=true accessed 17th April 2011 [23] Basel II: The International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards A Revised Framework, 2004 [24] E Fournier, ‘How Basel Should Change’ 28 IFLR 16 (2008-2010), 20 http://login.westlaw.co.uk/maf/wluk/app/document?src=rlsrguid=ia744c09a0000012ffaeb98dabae8321bdocguid=I57126030E6A411DDB056C665510274F9hitguid=I57126030E6A411DDB056C665510274F9spos=1epos=1td=1crumb-action=appendcontext=7resolvein=true accessed 21st April 2011 [25] International Regulatory Framework for Banks, 2010 [26] R Bollen, ‘The International financial system and future global regulation’ JIBLR (2008) 23(9), 470 http://login.westlaw.co.uk/maf/wluk/app/document?src=rlsrguid=ia744c0970000012fd01158ecc34d593cdocguid=I53D96EE057A211DDA3BBFE4B3DB72F6Bhitguid=I53D96EE057A211DDA3BBFE4B3DB72F6Bspos=8epos=8td=15crumb-action=appendcontext=37resolvein=true accessed 21st April 2011 [27] Economics online ‘Banking regulation’ economicsonline.co.uk/Business_economics/Banking+regulation.html accessed 15th April 2011 [28] ‘Bank regulation failed – Lords Committee’ (moneyfacts 2nd June 2009) http://moneyfacts.co.uk/news/economy/bank-regulation-failed-lords-committee/ accessed 16th April 2011 [29]   DK Tarullo, ‘Banking on Basel: The future of International Financial Regulation (1st edn, The Peterson Institute For International Economics, 2008) 141-143 [30] Introduced the Banking Act 2009 [31] F J Cardim de Carvalho ‘Basel II:   A critical assessment’,(March 2005) 19 ie.ufrj.br/eventos/seminarios/pesquisa/basel_ii_a_critical_assessment.pdf accessed 26th April 2011 [32] The Times Online, ‘Bankers to blame for the economic â€Å"mess† ‘   (The Sunday Times 28th   February 2008) http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/industry_sectors/banking_and_finance/article5820951.ece accessed 16th April 2011 [33] ‘Causes and costs of a global financial crisis’ (The Sunday Times 2nd October 2008) timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/letters/article4862921.ece accessed 16th April 2011 [34] F J Cardim de Carvalho ‘Basel II:   A critical assessment’,(March 2005) 19 ie.ufrj.br/eventos/seminarios/pesquisa/basel_ii_a_critical_assessment.pdf accessed 26th April 2011 [35] D K Tarullo, ‘Banking on Basel: The future of International Financial Regulation (1st edn, The Peterson Institute For International Economics, 2008) 178 [36] E Ferran, K Alexander, ‘Can soft law bodies be effective? 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